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STATEMENT OF CASE
On July 23, 1971, the final, foundation Judgment on Stirulation herein
was entered in the court below. The sum effect of said judgment was to
partition certain land between the parties and to reouire that the Defendants-Apnellant discharae the financial obligations which encumbered
Resoondents' share of such partitioned land in order for Respondents
to obtain free and clear title thereof. Said final Judgment on Stipulation was never appealed.
During the period August, 1971, through February, 1975, numerous
nleadinqs were filed and hearings held in connection with Respondents'
efforts to have said Judgment on Stipulation enforced against the Defendants-Anoel lant, the latter being in default of that part of said
judgment requiring them to discharge the financial obligations against
Respondents' subject nroperty.
On Aori l 8, 1975, the 1O\•ier court executed an Order, entered on
April 28, 1975, confirming that the Defendants-Aopellant had to discharge whatever financial obligations existed aaainst Respondents'
subject land sufficient for its release to the latter, and, granting
Respondents' motion for leave to execute aaainst the DefendantsAnnellant relative to said obliqations. The Anril 8, 1975, Order was
not appealed, nor a notice rendered oreserving such right of appeal
for Defendants-Appellant.
Subsequently, the Defendants-Appellant moved to vacate the said
April 8th Order, which motion was denied by the lower court's Order
dated tlovember 6, 1975, (entered November 10, 1975). An attack
was made by Defendants-Apoellant seeking to set aside said November
6, 1975, Order, which was denied by the court below under its MemoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l.

randum Decision dated June 21, 1977, (Order thereon entered September
2, 1977); and, said Memorandum Decision further reauired that the
Respondents' financial claims in this action be brought current and
embodied in a money judgment.
Thus, in compliance with the lower court's said June 21, 1977,
Memorandum Decision reouiring Respondents' claims to be brouaht current by way of a money judgment herein, Respondents filed a motion
for partial summary judgment in the sum of $98,000.00. This matter
was heard in the court bela1•1 on July 18, 1977, and cons:itutes the
primary subject-matter of the within aopeal being prosecuted by
Appellant.
DISPOSITION OF LOVJER COURT
On September 6, 1977, after hearing Defendants-Appellant's objections to the court's proposed findings and judgment, the court

b~

low made and entered findings and Judgment in favor of Resoondents
on the latter's motion for partial summary judgment in the sum of
$98,000.00. From that rulinq by the Honorable James S. Sav1aya, Judge,

of the Summit County District Court, the Appellant has taken its
appeal herein; and, said appeal is apparently also taken from the
lower court's Memorandum Decision (and Order thereon dated September
2, 1977), dated June 21, 1977, executed by the Honorable Peter Leary,
District Court Judge.
The other Defendants in the court below have not joined in the
subject appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL
Respondents respectfully represent to this Utah Sunreme Court
that the September 6, 1977, Judgment executed by Judge James S. Sawaya
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2.

and the tAemorandum Decision of June 21, 1977 (with Order thereon dated
September 2, 1977) executed by Judge Peter Leary, should be affirmed
in all particulars in this proceeding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Under date of July 23, 1971, the court below executed a Judgment
on Stipulation [Record: 308

]. constituting the basic decree in this

action. Said adjudication partitioned certain land between the parties,
and imposed upon the Appellant, inter alias, a duty to discharge
financial obligations that burdened the land thus oartitioned to the
Respondents. Said Judgment on Stipulation was not annealed.
All the lower court Defendants, including ,;ppellant, were at once
in substantial default on their responsibilities under said Judgment
on Stipulation 1vhich required them to ray-off the monetary obligations
against the pronerty partitioned to Respondents. Aopellant allowed
funds earmarked for the trust (described in the July 23, lg71, decree;
supra.), 1-1hich funds belonged to Respondents, to be used for the
Defendants-Appellant's benefit involving the latter's oartitioned land
instead of the obligations called for by said decree favoring the
Respondents. Said diversion of funds involved in excess of $200,000.00.
[Record: All documentation during period August 1971, to March 1, 1975].
For said period August 1971, through February, 1975, the Respondents sought to have said financial payment provisions of the original
July, 1971, decree (supra.) enforced by the court below. Respondents'
said claims and Appellant's purported defenses thereto comprised the
subject-matter of various pleadings and hearings in the lower court
during said 1971 to 1975 period.
Although the venue of this case vested in the Summit County DistSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rict Court, conduct of the matter occurred mainly in Fourth Judicial
headquarters, Provo, Utah, over 60 miles distance from the Summit
County Clerk's office. For these reasons the filing of court orders
and other administrative efforts were often delayed between Provo
and Coalville Courthouse in Summit County. The disparate chronology
of entry dates in this respect is thus reflected in the record on
appeal.
In consequence of all that took place during the aforementioned
August 1971, through February 1975, time period, the court belo\'1
executed its Order dated April 8, 1975, [Record:914-917]. Said April
8th Order of the court below confirmed the validity, intent and
purpose of the original Judgment on Stipulation (supra.) whereby the
Appellant was to discharge any financial requirements necessary to
release Respondents' land free and clear of encumbrances. Said
April 8th Order further granted Respondents leave to execute against
.11.ppellant for recovery of sufficient funds to accomplish such intent
and purpose, by which

Respondents' land would be released to them.

This April 8, 1975, Order (entered April 28, 1 975) of the

10~1er

court

was not appea 1ed, nor was the same othen-1i se preserved for appea 1
at a later date.
On or about May 2, 1975, one of Appe 11 ant's attorneys, David C.
Cook, was personally informed of the aforesaid April 8, 1975, Order,
[Record:

878

], a copy of which Order had been previously mailed to

said attorney's employers (Appellant's attorneys of record). Thereafter,
a second copy of the April 8th Order was mailed to said attorney for
Appellant since he had recently left the employ of Appellant's counsel
of record firm, Nielsen, Conder, Henroid and Gottfredson [Record: 878
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On May 16, 1975, Appellant's said co-counsel, David

c.

Cook, received

the above mentioned second copy of the April 8th Order [Record:SQ8( 4 )J.
Pursuant to the April 8th Order, the current monetary amount due
from Appellant, then outstanding and necessary to obtain the release
of Respondents' partitioned property, was determined and presented
to the Summit County Court Clerk, who in turn issued a Hrit of Execution, dated May 15, 1975, in the sum of $73,653.53 [Record: 4i6

].

Under date of June 5, 1975, Appellant filed a motion.which sought
to vacate and set aside the aforesaid April 8, 1975, Order [Record:428 ].
On July 11, 1975, by further motion Anpellant attemnted to vacate the
aforementioned May 15, 1975, Writ of Execution, [Record: 437

].

During the Summer and Fall of 1975 several hearings

held

~iere

concerning Appellant's said June 5th and July 11th motions, (supra.)
dealing with the court's April 8th Order and May 15th Writ [Record:809(6)
850(9) ] .
On November 6, 1975, the court below executed its Order
.~opellant's

denyin~

said June 5, 1975, and ,July 11, 1975, motions, which denial

Order was entered :'lovember 10, 1975, [Record: 766

].

On or about said November E, 1975, date a copy of the said Order
denying Appellant's motions was mailed to Appellant's counsel of record,
Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson [Record:

849

].

During, and subsequent to, the proceedings concerning the issues
embraced by said November 6, 1975, Order, Respondents attemoted to
find assets of the Appellant in the state of Utah, without success,
[Record: 850(8) ]. However, nearly one year later Resoondents discovered certain of Appellant's assets in California. Whereuoon, a sister
state

civil action was filed in said latter state, based upon the
5.
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original Judgment on Stipulation herein (supra.) together with all the
subsequent decrees and orders of the court below.
Thus, on being surprised by Respondents' discovery of their Calif.
ornia assets, after nearly one year's search therefor, on October 12

'

1976, Appellant filed its "Motion For Relief From Order Dated November
6, 1975" [Record: 806

] , based primarily on their claim that Appell.

ant's previous co-counsel, David C. Cook, the employee-lawyer of
Appellant's counsel of record, Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson,
had not been formally served with the aforesaid

~'lovember

6, 1975,

Order, one year earlier. No mention was made of the fact that said
counsel of record had been _so served, just after the rlovember 6th
Order was rendered[Record: 849

; supra.]. Moreover, said David C.

Cook's new employers were at no time substituted or made co-counsel
of record for Aooellant. At all times hereinabove mentioned the fim
of Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson appeared as counsel in
this regard, in spite of David C. Cook's new employment and his submitting several documents to the lower court from his new address.
When said Cook finally withdrew from this case, he did so as an
individual without reference to any other firm [Record: 840

].

Respondents filed a motion dated October 23, 1976, requesting the
lower court for an order increasing the previous amount detennined 18
months earlier (May 15, 1975, Writ; supra.), to the most recent figure due from Appellant in the sum of $98,000.00, [Record:

836

].

Such latter amount resulted from additional "principal, interest and
other costs and expenses attributable" to Appellant's obligations, as
permitted by the lower court's April 8, 1975, Order (supra.; second
paragraph thereof).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On June 21, 1977, the court below executed its Memorandum Decision [Record: 883

] embracing issues raised by Appellant's Octo-

ber 12, 1976, motion (supra.) as well as Respondents' October 23,
1976, motion (supra.). An Order based upon said Memorandum Decision
was later entered [Record:l029 ].
The net effect of the lower court's ruling contained in the
June 21, 1977, decision was to: 1.) deny Appellant's October 12th
motion; and, 2.) require that the latest accumulated monetary
obligations due to Respondents from the Appellant be brought current
in the form of a money judgment, "after notice and a hearing",
(Memorandum Decision, supra.; Page 4, last naragraoh}.
Therefore, as of June 21, 1977, by virtue of the lower court's
ruling on said date, there remained but one single issue to be determined herein:

what amount of money did Apoellant (and the other

defendants be 1ow) currently

o~le

to Respondents, in order to compen-

sate the latter for expenditures made to obtain the release of
their property partitioned under the original Judgment on Stipulation, dated July 23, 1971, (supra.)?
In accordance with the said June 21, 1977, ruling (supra.),
Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment, dated
July 6, 1977, [Record: 919

], seeking the latest accumulated sum

due from Appellant, in the amount of $98,000.00. Annexed to said
Respondents' motion were affidavits and exhibits showing: 1.) that
Respondents had disbursed the sum of $98,000.00; 2.) that said sum
was paid to third parties in order to obtain the release of
specific real property to Respondents; and, 3.) that all of the
specific property so released was part of the land described in

7.
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the original July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation partitioned to the
Respondents.
Appellant filed only one affidavit [Record: 954

] in opposi-

tion to Respondents' aforesaid motion for oartial summary judgment.
Nowhere in said affidavit, entitled: "Affidavit of Robert lo/. Ensign",
(supra.), filed as a purported response to Resrondents' motion, does
the same contradict the specific, limited facts set forth in the
Respondents' supporting affidavits and exhibits annexed to their said
motion for partial summary judgment [Record:921-935].
Instead, Appellant addressed itself to factual issues outside
the scope of the limited, material facts recited by Respondents in the
latter's supnorting affidavits and exhibits.
Because of the justification stated in Respondents' said

supper~

ing affidavits with exhibits atrached, and the failure of Appellant's
single counter-affidavit (supra.) to raise a material, factual issue
relating thereto, the court below determined that on the undisputed
facts, and based upon the legal obligations under the original stipulated judgment of 1971 , the ,ll,pril 3, 1975, 0rder, the ilovember 6,
1975, Order and June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision hereinbefore
described, there was no triable issue; and, as a matter of law the
Respondents were entitled to their summary judgment.
On July 26, 1977, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the
court below, granted Respondents' motion for partial summary judgment, "as prayed" [Record: 958

].

On July 28, 1977 Respondents submitted proposed findings and
judgment to Appellant who then objected to the same and set the matter
for hearing on September 6, 1977, [Record:993,999]. Respondents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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answered Appellant's said objections in a subseouent memorandum,
[Record:

980

].

After a hearing held on September 6, 1977, concerning Appellant's objections to the proposed findings and judgment form, the
10~1er

court executed said findings-judgment instrument and over-

ruled Aopellant's objections thereto, [Record: 1016 ].
From said Judgment of September 6, 1977, the Appellant has
taken its appeal in this oroceeding.
ARGUMEf'IT
POiflT I:

THE 1971 STIPULATED JUDGMEtlT MID APRIL 8, 1975, ORDER,

FORM THE BASIS OF APPELLANT'S OBLIGATioris HEREIN, HHICH riusT GUIDE
THIS APPEAL.
The July 23, 1971, stipulated judgment [Record: 308

] was not

appealed, nor was the April 8, 1975, Order [Record :91~917 ] interpreti ng the same appea 1ed, or preserved for review as required by Rule
72 (a) and Rule 72 (b), U.R.C.P. Since the filing date for the April
8th Order was April 28, 1975, (suora.), Appellant had until

r~ay

28,

1975, to seek an appeal or otherviise plead to protect their right of
review thereof. Having failed to do so, Appellant is anchored to
said decrees.
Hence, as of April 8, 1975, whatever else had transpired in this
case until then, such factors were immutably validated and/or merged
into said July 23, 1971, and April 8, 1975, decrees by virtue of the
language set forth in said latter, 1975, Order. Implicitly, the lower
court, acting by and through the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge,
considered any and all the multitude of pleadings, evidence and argument that occurred from July, 1971 through April 8, 1975, in reaching
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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its decision of April 8th, 1975.
Any attempt by Appellant to have issues reviewed in this appeal
which were raised, or should have been raised, prior to the hearings
and other proceedings upon which either or both said 1971 and April
8th decreee,were based, such issues are barred, according to these
rulings:
" A prior judgment [or order] is res judicata on matters 1vhich
were raised or could have been raised on matters litigated or
litigatable" (Emphasis and brackets ours)
Orv1it v. Bd. of Dental
388

Examiners etc., (Calif.) 55 Cal App.2d

" The doctrine of res judicata extends not only to questions
actually decided but to all matters which might have been
raised or determined, anOdefenses vihich parties might)have
oresented, whether they d1 d so or not." (Emphasis ours
Brady v. F & C Co. of New York (Ill.) 24 NE 2d 895, 303 Ill
App. 230
In sunport of the foregoing doctrine of res judicata, including
the principle of collateral estoppel, is this Utah view:
"[l] Strictly sneaking, the term res judi ca ta aopl ies to a
judgment betvieen the same riarties v1ho in a orior action
litigated the identical auestions 1vhich are riresented in the
later case. riot only are the parties bound by the rul ino on
matters actually litioated, but thev are also nrevented from
raising issues which should have been raised in the former
action. The rule of law is wise in that it gives finality to
judgments and also conserves the time of the courts ... "
(Emphasis added)
Richards v Hodson, (Utah 1971), 485 P2d 1044, at page 1046
Thus, having demonstrated that the July 23, 1971 stipulated
judgment and its implementing Order dated April 8, 1975, are the
governing decrees in these proceedings which bar all issues prior
to either one of them, that cannot be attacked on aopeal herein,
the next step is to ascertain what said instruments hold relative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to Aorellant's financial obligations herein. A orogressive review of
said decrees discloses the following:
The Judgment on Stinulation
Dated July 23, i97l
[Record: 308 ]
" ... it is hereby ordered that the nroperty be divided awarded
and confirmed to the parties as follows: TO THE PLAIMfIFF: ...
Those certain parcels ... described as follows: ... 8, 9, 10, 11 and
12."

(Bottom of Page 2; Top of Page 3 in judgment)
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ... A.) ... the defendants [Anpellant, et al.]
shall deoosit said proceeds in a separate trust account ... said
proceeds are to be segregated ... and aoplied only to original
seller obligations ... by the defendants [Appellant et al.] to insure performance of the ob l i ga ti ons ... "

(Middle of Page 6 in judgment)
SPECIAL ilOTE: Throuahout the voluminous record on appeal, too
extensive to be reneated here, are unchallenged references and
evidence indicatina that one or all of the defendants did collect
the funds mentioned abov~. either directly or by borrowing on
the "trust" (suora.) corpus, but diverted the same soley to their
own use and benefit thereby defaulting on their obligations to
Resoondents herein.
"IT IS el1RTHER ORDERED that the above stated payment orocedure ..

.... is viithout prejudice to plaintiff [Respondents] invoking all
of its riahts and remedies aqainst defendants in the event of
breach or default."
(Next to last naragraph, Page 7, in judament)
Order Dated April 8, 1975
[Record: 914 to 917]
" ... Judgment on Stipulation dated July 23, 197~ ....• said ~ecre:s
are final and valid and bindina upon the parties hereto, it being
the duty of the def~ndants [Aopellant et al .J ~o nay and ~is~harge
the ourchase money obliaations on the land divided to plaintiff ...
some' of vihich obligations are now in default."
(Paqe l, First Paragraph, in !'Jrder)
" ... defendants sha 11 certify in writing to this co~rt.:. the amo~nts
of orincioal and interest and other costs and obl1aations attributable the~eto, currently ~ue and owing upon original purchase money
11 .
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oblioations encomoassing land divided to said olaintiff [oespond
ents] ... sufficient to obtain release of prorerty to said ~laintiff
which are currently due for release ... "
(Page l, Second Paragraph, in Order)
" .. pla,intiffs' motion for leave to execute .. is hereby granted as
to amounts herein referred to sufficient to discharge outstanding purchase money obligations for the release of land therefr~
embracing land divided herein to ... [Respondents] .. "
(Page l, Third Paragraph, in Order)
" ... balances currently due and owing ... for the rel ease of land
originally divided to said plaintiffs ... "
(Page l, Fourth Paragraph; Page 2, in Order)
The Summary Of Point I
Therefore, the foreqoing analysis clearly indicates the validity
and controlling nature of the July 23, 1971, Judament on Stinulation
and Aoril 8, 1975, Order, and that /l,opellant was required to discharce
the 111onetary obliqations aaainst "narcels ... 8, 9, li'J, 11 and 12" (sunra.
"sufficient to obtain release of nrooerty to said olaintiff" (supra.),
Further, " .. that the above stated

payment procedure ... is without rre-

judice to nlaintiff invoking all of its rights and remedies aaainst
defendants [Arpellant] in the event of t:reach or default .. " (supra.):
and, that Aopellant, along with the other defendants, had indeed
defaulted as of April 8, 1975.
POHIT II:

THE rmrl-APPEALABLE tlOVEMBER 6' 1975" ORDER REAFFIRMED THE

PRIOR DECREES HEREIN.
The Statement.of FaGts hereof show that the Aopellant attacked bot'
the aforementioned April 8, 1975, Order and the l.Jrit of Execution therec
dated May 15, 1975. Appellant's said effort was nresented by way of it
motions dated June 5th and July 11th of that year [Record:428,437].
After several hearings held on said ~otions of ,June 5th and July
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1:

during the summer and fall of 1975, [Statement of Facts], the same judge
of the lower court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, who had executed the
original 1971 Judgment on Stipulation as well as the April 8, 1975,
Order, and who had heard and considered all the issues involved herein
for the intervening four years

bet~1een

those decrees, overruled Appellant's

attack thereon by denying the latter's said motions.
Said lower court's ruling

~1as

executed on Movember 6, 1975, and

entered on Movember 10, 1975, [Record: 766 ] . However, said Order of
rlovember 6th did not adjudicate "substantial rights" (infra.) of the
parties, since that affirmative action had been previously accomrlished
by the court below in its original 1971 stipulated judgment and by its
April 8, 1975, Order, [POINT I, surra.]. On the contrary, all the lower
court actually did vi a its November 6, 1975, Order,
act in the way Apoellant wished under

th~

~1as

to refuse to

latter's motions. Overruling

a motion and making an order that affirmatively reouires soecific
nerformance are entirely different matters. The said November 6th Order
neither added or subtracted anything to or from the cumulative action
taken by the court

belo~1

through the

r~ay

15, 1975, \frit of Execution

date. For these reasons we submit that the said rlovember 6, 1975, Order
is non-appealable, based on the following decisions:
"The overrruling of motion ..• was not a judgment or decree, ~or
an order affecting a substantial right that in effect determ1n7s
the action or suit so as to prevent a judgment or decree theremn,
and is not reviewable on appeal." (Emphasis added)
Francisco v. Stringfield, (Ore.) 114 P2d 1026, 1028
"The overruling of a motion ... cannot be.an ord:r ~ffecting a substantial right made in a soecial proceed1ng .•• w~th1n the ~tatutory
definition of appealable, final order, because.1n effect l~ constitutes refusal to make order rather than mak1nq of order
Swanson v. Ridge Tool Co., (Ohio) 178 ME2d 255, (Emphasis ours)
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" .. appeal from an order 'affecting a substantial right' relates
only to the subject matter of the 1i ti ga ti on, and not to mere
matters of practice. Thus, an order den in a motion to set
aside a judgment [the facts in this appeal herein! ... is not one
affecting a subs tanti a1 right." (Emphasis and brackets added)
Rahn v. Gunnison, (\./is) 12 His 528, 531 (Apparently the only
reporting volume)
Even if the said November 6, 1975, Order was an appealable order,
(which it was not, supra.), the Appellant had timely notice of the
same [Record: 849

]. Counsel of record at that time 1-1ho had notice

for Appellant was the firm of rlielsen, Conder, Henroid & Got':fredson.
The fact that an employee of such firm,

r~r.

David C. Cook, purportedly

did not knov1 of the Order unti 1 one year 1ater, does not oresent the
Aopellant 1-Jith a defense. Aside from the very unlikely notion that
a lawyer who had made two extensive rrotions (June 5th, July 11th, suora
would not be expected to make some kind of inquiry within a vear thereafter, as claimed by

~1r.

Cook, there are other reasons \'1hy the rlovember

6, 1975, ()rder cannot be apnealed or othel"\•1ise reviewed at this point.

That is, Rule 73 (a), U.R.C.P. limited the period for taking an
appea 1 from said November 6th Order to: " .. not exceeding one month fror
the expiration of the original time" for filing the notice of appeal,
or 60 days from the date the order complained of was entered. In any
event, Appellant had until January 10, 1976, to take an appeal or to
preserve its right, assuming it had obtained a proper extension of the
first 30 day period (supra.). Appellant failed to so protect its right
of appeal with regard to said November 6th Order, so whether or not
the same is or is not appealable in nature can be considered moot. The
case of Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P2d 845, 847, support>
Respondents' analysis in this connection.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14.

Thus, the subject rlovember 6th Order effectively confirmed the
prior action of the court below in these terms:
" ... July 23, 197~ [Judgment] ... defendants [Appellant et al.]
were ordered to discharge certain monetary obligations to the
original sellers of the plaintiffs' [Respondents] property are
final and valid.ju?gments bi~ding ueon all parties •... the time
for appeal of within proceeding having expired in the year
1971 ... Joseph L. Krofcheck [a Respondent] .. acquired his interest
in the aforementioned real property as a purchaser from plaintiff
[a Responde~t] ... and as an assignee of certain rights of said
plaintiffs in and to such judgments------defendants' motion ..•
seeking to vac~te this court's prior order of April 8, 1975,
and the execution thereof [May 15, 1975, Writ] ... are hereby
denied." (Emphasis and brackets added)
November 6, 1975, Order, court below (suora.)
The Summary Of Point II
The above discussion establishes that the subject November 6,
1975, Order was probably a non-appeal able order, but, in any ev.ent,
Appellant failed to take any action toward perfecting an apneal within the time permitted by Rule 73 (a) O.R.C.P ..
Said Order, again, validated the July 23, 1971, stipulated judgment and the April 8, 1975, Order. Said ruling also reaffirmed that the
Apnellant had to discharge the monetary obligatiuns on Respondents'
orooerty, and in assessing such liability the Order clearly states
that the decrees are "binding upon al 1 parties" (supra.).
Respondent Joseph L. Krofcheck, M.D., as a judgment assignee in
the within proceeding, is identified at this juncture in the case.
POHIT II I:

THE JUNE 21, 1977,

MEMORArlDU~1

DECISION, WITH ORDER OF

SEPTEMBER 2, 1977 THEREON, ARE NOM-APPEALABLE AND CONFIRM THE PRIOR
DECREES HERE HJ.
The lower court's June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision [Record: 883

J

together v1ith its implementing Order dated Seotember 2, 1977 [Record:1029J.
15.
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overrule Appellant's motion that sought to vacate an order, which

or~r

itself was overruling two other motions filed by Appellant (June 5th
and July 11, 1975) that sought to vacate still another Order (April 8

'

1975) and its execution.
Only the last mentioned Order of April 8, 1975, acted on the

"substantial rights" of the parties, v1hich Arnellant failed to aopeal.
Like the Movember 6, 1975, Order before it (POirlT II, supra.), the
subject June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision merely refused to act
as to such substantial rights, by denyino action. urned by Appellant,
(Its October 12, 197E, motion; suora: Statement of Facts).
Hence, for the same legal reasons set forth under PO PIT II hereof,
relating to non-appealability, the suhject iflemorandurn flecision, and
Order thereon, are non-aooealable rulings. Only the decrees discussed
under POHIT I are appealable, v1hich v1ere, of course, not appealed.
Beyond the appealability issue of the said

~~emorandum

Decision,

the levier court, acting through the Honorable Peter Leary, recognized it could not set aside the orior rlovember 6, 1975, iJrder of
Judge Harding's (sunra.), a colleague on the District Court bench,
as requested by Appellant's motion of October 12, l97G. The controlling Utah decisions have repeated said rule of lav1 several
times in the recent past.in these cases:
Harward v. Harward, (Utah 1974), 526 P2d 1183
Peterson v. Peterson, ( Ut. 197 4) , 530 P2d 821
State of Utah v. r~organ, (Ut.1974), 527 P2d 225
Leaving the said validity issue, it is necessary to observe
exactly what effect said r·~emorandum Decision had on the within
proceedings. Aside from denying Appellant's motion of October 12th
(supra.), which upheld all prior decrees and orders of the court,
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there remained essentially one question for current resolution,
namely:

1~hat

is the present monetary amount due from Appellant

to Respondents under the lower court's decrees herein?
Said current amount due from Appellant was claimed to be
$98,000.00, by Respondents, before Judge Leary [Record:

836

].

However, the prior Writ of Execution was for $73,653.53,
[Record: 426

].

. Therefore, Judge Leary, of the court be l 01-1, ordered that a
hearing be held, after notice, to ascertain exactly what was due
under the lower court's various decrees. This was the substantive,
net effect of the subject 11emorandum Decision and Order thereon
dated September 2, 1977. Such issue was narrowly drawn and the procedure for resolving the same spelled out by requiring a hearing
in the future on said matter. This was the posture of the case on
June 21, 1977, the date Judge Leary executed his Memorandum Decision.
The Summary Of Point III
Our foregoing evaluation

shm~s

that the June 21, 1977, Memor-

andum Decision and September 2, 1977, Order thereon, are most likely
non-appealable rulings. However, despite this condition Judge Leary
could not set aside Judge Harding's prior rulings, under Utah law,
and of course did not do so.
After demonstrating the propriety of Judge Leary's subject
rulings, it is seen that only a single issue remained for current
resolution, as of June 21, 1977, involving the amount outstanding
due from Appe 11 ant to Resoondents under the 1ower court decrees·
Said matter 1-1as to be determined in a hearing, after notice thereof.
All else stated by Judge Leary merely confirmed the prior decrees.
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POINT IV:

THE LOWER COURT'S SEPTEMBER 6, 1977 JUDGtAENT ANO FHID-

INGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ANO UTAH LM1.
On June 21 , 1977, the 1ower court had rendered its 1ates t decision (POINT III, supra.) in these proceedings, to the effect that prior
orders and decrees executed by it were valid and subsisting, and, that
a hearing must be held to determine the current, outstanding balance
due from Appellant (et al.) to Respondents.
Pursuant to said edict of the court below, Respondents filed a
motion for partial summary judgment [Record: 919 ] addressing
current question open for determi nation , to 1,,; t:

the~

how much money did

Appellant presently owe to Respondents?
Attached to Respondents' said motion were affidavits and exhiMb
that clearly and unequivocally showed how much was due, on

~1hat

basis

it was due and why it was due from Appellant, inter alios.
However, when Appellant replied to Respondents' affidavits and
exhibits they did so with a single, self-serving affidavit which did
not address the material facts before the lm·1er court [Record: 954 ]
involving Respondents' motion for partial summary judament. In essence,
here are the irrelevant points set forth in Appellant's said counteraffidavit executed by one Robert

~I.

Ensign:

1.) Ensign Company [Appellant] is now dissolved. (COMMENT: A con·
clusion without stating evidentiary facts; and., wholly immaterial).
2.) Ensign Company has not had anything to do with the real prop·
erty or fi nanci a 1 transactions which is the subject matter of the
Respondents' motion since the fall of 1969. (CO~MENT: Two years later,
in 1971, the within Judgment on Stipulation held Ensign Company lia~e
as a named defendant, relative to many transactions and parcels of lanai
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3.) Ensign Company had no dealings with funds received from the
sale of certain real prooerty, and makes no claim on said monies.
(CGr1MErlT: Under the July 23, 1971, judgment,

Ensign~

liable for

the funds and sale of said property, and if it did not involve itself with such matters it did so irresronsibly. In any case, has
nothing to do 1-Ji th the amount of 1i ability to P.espondents).
4.) Ensign Company had no dealings with the Respondent Joseph
L. Krofcheck, M.D. since 1969. (COMrUJT: Does not change or affect
Krofcheck's status as a judgment assignee, nor Ensign's status as
a judgment debtor).
5. It is Robert Ensign's opinion that the subject-matter land
is not worth $98,000.00. (CO"r 1Er!T: The only noint involved is what
it

cost to obtain the re 1ease of the oroperty, de soi te what it may

be 1-1orth. Said allegation, ts merely Ensign's unsubstantiated opinion at best.).
6. Ensign Comoany did not encumber the Pesoondents' prooerty.
(COMr~E'.JT:

Totally irrelevant. All the documentation in the record

admits that third parties had the encumbrances. It was Ensign's
responsibility to pay them off).
From the foregoing analysis of

Appellant's~

counter-

affidavit, we easily see that said allegations, whether in good
form or not, neither directly or indirectly refute the narrow
allegations set forth by Respondents with their motion for partial
summary judgment [Record :921-935 ], as ca 11 ed for by the 1ower court's
June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision (supra.), as follows:
A.) Parcels 8, 9, HJ, 11 and 12 described in the July 23, 1971,
Judgment on Stipulation, is the real prooerty upon which the Apoellant
19.
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,
failed to pay the outstanding financial obligations due, as required
by the 1ower court's decrees. (COMMENT: Nowhere does Appe 11 ant ever
dispute this allegation of Respondents.)
B.) Respondents paid the sum of $98,000.00 cash to recover said
real property, after Appellant, et al., failed to pay anything what.
ever toward said property's release. (COMMENT: This is not denied.
Only an unsubstantiated opinion concerning value is offered by the
Appe 11 ant).
C.) Appellant, et al., have at no time reimbursed or other.1ise
compensated Respondents for any nortion of the

$~8,000.00 expended~

the latter on Appellant's obligation covered by the lower court decree1.
(COrAMENT: Appellant has never denied this).
Thus, Respondents' said affidavits and exhibits stand undisputed . .11.11 that is left for the court bel01v is to ascertain if said
uncontroverted facts are a basis for recovery under the court's
decrees, as a matter of law.
Based upon the aforesaid o1ead i ngs and evi denti a ry ma teri a1, a
hearing was held on July 13, 1977, before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, of the court below. Appellant was as unresponsive to the
materi a 1 facts presented by Resoondents' motion, as it had been
before the hearing through the Robert W. Ensign affidavit. Hence,
Appellant's case must rest on whatever legal effect said Ensign
affidavit has on this case, and nothing else, respecting the
Respondents' motion for partial summary judgment.
Therefore, the Appellant has failed to meet the criteria
imposed by Rule 56 (e) U.R.C.P., in nurportedly opposing the
said motion for summary judgment, since it has failed to: "set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
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trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appronriate,
shall be entered against him ", (Rule 56 (e), supra.).
Appellant's said counter-affidavit is filled with opinion and unsuo9orted conclusions, which this Utah case deems inadequate:
" Affidavit does not comport with the requirements of this rule
[Rule 56 (e)J where it r~veals n? ~videntiary facts but merely
reflects the unsubstantiated o in1ons and conclusions in regard to the transacti ans." (Emphasis ours
\lalker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P2d 538 (Utah)
Even if one were to construe Ensign's affidavit (supra.) as containing some competent recitals of evidentiary fact, it certainly does
not contain any that are material and resnonsive to Pespondents'
affidavits and exhibits, annexed to their summary ,judgment motion.
Cesides the main award of $98,000.00 embraced ty the lower court's
Judgment, granting Respondents' said motion, said instrument also set
forth fi ndi n(1s Hh i ch J\poe 11 ant has likewise attacked in the court bel ov1. Before defending-on the merits of such attack, the following
doctrine should be raised:
" The traditional function of an apnellate court is merely to
apoly the law to findings of fact made below ... the appellate
court is ordi na ril y ~1ithout authority to make i ndenendent
findings ... "
5 Am Jur2d 337, Section 900
The specificity of the lower court's findings set forth in its
subject September 6, 1977, Judgment, is fully supported by the record
in this action that preceded said Judgment; and, as to those portions
of said record particularly relied upon by the lQifer court, acting by
and through the Honorable James S. Sawr.ya, Judge, the same were either
unchallenged by Appellant, or were beyond challenge by reason of the
Appellant's failure to take an appeal therefrom.
21.
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It follows that the next ouestion on this subject should in()uire:
what precisely did Judge Sawaya find, and on what basis did he find
Referring to said Seotember E, 1977, Judgment document itself
1016

it)

[Reco~·

], the outline below discloses the substance of each finding and

the corresponding basis for the same in the record:
Re: Findings l and 2: The validity of the lower court's nrior decrees, the binding effect thereof on all parties herein and the obligation of Appellant and the other Defendants to obtain the release
of Respondents' real prorerty awarded in this action, are matters
clearly raised and adjudicated in those specific terms by some or
all of the lower court's proceedings before entry of the said Sentember 6, 1977, Judgment and findings, (See July 23, 1971 Judgment
on Stipulation; April 8, 1975, Order;

~loverr!ber

6, 1975, Order).

Pe: Findino 3: The fact that Aopellant's default under the

lo~

er court's decrees would compel them to legally remedy that default,
as provided by 1a1·1 and enui ty, is fundarrenta 1 . Moreover, one of the
said decrees specifically contemrlates that should .l\noellant and the
other defendants fail to meet their l)ayrnent obligations to Pesnondents,
"it is 1-lithout prejudice to nlaintiff [Respondents] invoking all of
its rights and remedies against defendants in the event of breach or
default", (See July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation, bottom of page
7) -

Re: Findings 4, 5, and 6: The failure of the Appellant, et al.,
to meet their subject financial obligations to Resoondents as to~~
eels 8 through 12, Respondents' payment of $93,COO.OO to recover sue~
land and the fact that no part of that sum was ever reimbursed, a~
facts 1eft undisputed by ,Lippe ll ant's counte r-affi davit to Respondents'
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motion for rartial summary judgment, (See this POirlT IV, supra.).
Re: Findinri 7: Dr .. Josenh L. Krofcheck's status as a oroper
judgment assignee herein has never been challenged, although said
fact was set forth in both the lower court's orders: and, also a
direct statement thereof apneared with Respondents' motion (See
:iovernter 6, 1975, 'lrder and i".rofcheck affidavit annexed to motion
for rartial summary judgment, suora.).
Re: Findina 8: The fact a change has occurred in the outstanding balance due Resoondents is not disnuted, thereby necessitating
an amendrient to the original Writ of Execution, (See June 21, 1977,
i~emorandum

Oeci s ion).
The Summary Of Point IV

Therefore, just

~rior

to Judqe Sawaya entering the case, in the

Su111mer of 1977, at the trial court level, there remained a single issue
for determination, namely:

1~hat

was the current outstanding balance

due from Anoellant to Pesnondents under the nrior decrees? Thereupon,
Respondents rresen ted their affi davits and ex hi bi ts shovli nq they had
naid out $9s,n0ri.00 cash to recover land awarded earlier in this case,
an obligation which really devolved unon Appellant and the other defendants herein. In reoly to Resnondents' said evidence, Anoellant
confronted extraneous issues having no material bearing on the farmer's
motion for partial summary judgment, yet failed

to dispute in any way

Respondents' said evidence.
After the hearing on Respondents' motion for nartial summary judgment, the 1ov1er court reviewed the files herein and developed findings
which were founded on those oarts of the record with substantial
evidentiary and/or judicial sunoort, thereby removing the comnetency
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of said findings as an issue in these appellate proceedings, (5 Am
Jur2d 337, supra.).
By virtue of said uncha 11 enged facts presented by Respondents
with their motion for partial summary judgment and the clear record
before it, the lower court's September 6, 1977, Judgment and findings are fully supported by Utah law.
POINT V:

CERT Arn SPECIFIC DEFErJSES Ii: APPELLMlT Is GRIEF \·JARRArlT

REFUTATION.
Re: Appellant's Claim That It
Had flo Knowledge Of The July 23,
1971, Judgment On Stioulation
'.·/here Appe 11 ant asserts that it v1as not bound by the basic July
23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation because said oarty had no

kno~1ledge

thereof, al though its counse 1 executed the same, we rr.us t observe that
there is nothing whatever in the record on apheal to sul,stantiate this
claim whether by Appellant's affidavit, or otherwise, nor so much asa
hint therein that said party even makes the claim in the first olace.
Instead, we have Aopellant's present cocounsel only nov1 raising the sai
issue merely by \'1ay of argument herein nearly seven years after the fat:
In addition t'ill being barred by the doctrine of laches, it should be poi!
ed out that such issue being raised for the first time on appeal in thi
form of argument herein is not evidence and on that basis is likevlise
barred from consideration by this Honorable Supreme Court.
Re: Appellant's Raising Of A Wide
Variety Of Factual Issues
Appellant's argument that there v1ere "crucial issues" of fact toi:
tried which would bar entry of the subject summary judgment by the cour:
below, fails to cite what facts 1~ere at issue that were material to thl
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Respondents' motion for nartial summary judgment herein. There ~ias only
one counter-affidavit presented by Anoellant opposing Resnondents' said
motion (See Statement of Facts hereof, Pages 7-8)~ and in that document
no such

11

crucial issues'; nor any material issue at a 11, were forthcomi no.

However, Appellant manaqes to raise a wide variety of fac~ual issues
in its brief which arose during the period July l, 1971, through ,January,
1975, (See Statement of Facts hereof, Pages 3-4), involving land parcels,
third party buyers, assignment of contracts, ad infinitum. An examination of the record on aooeal for that oeriod will disclos2 an extremel'!
broad spectrum of such issues represented in voluminous nleadings,
exhibits and testimony; and, the court belm: disoosed of said issues
by virtue of its decrees rendered thereafter which decrees 1·1ere not
aopealed nor

other1~ise

oreserved for appeal (See POil!TS I and II of

this Respondents' Brief). Moreover, even if said facts

~1hich

arose

before the April 8, 1975, Order and the November 6, 1975, 0rder (sunra.)
could be re vi e1-1ed by this Utah Supreme Court hereunder (v:hi ch they
cannot be), to the extent such orders created ambiguity concernina
the same, said facts would have to be viewed in a light favorina the
Respondent. Also, 1-1hatever findings that the lower court has thus far
rendered involving factual issues in this connection, they are to
be similarly viewed in favor of Respondent, all as set forth in
these statements of the rule:
Viewing the evidence and all fair inferences therefrom [is d?n~]
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs [Respondents] (c1t:,ng:
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Rd. Co., 239 P2d 163, Utah).
11

Mud Control Lab. v. Covey, (Utah) 269 P2d 854, (@Page 858,
first sentence; by Justice Crockett)
In suoport of the rule:

(Continued next oage)

25.
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11

[5]

11
,

11

[l] Facts must be viewed in light most favorable to resoondent,"

11

[2] Where any inference can be drawn to support findings
reviewing court may not make determinations of factual iss~es
contrary to those madebelow.
11

Solomon v. Polk Dev. Co., 54 Cal Rptr 22 (Calif.)
Thus, we recognize that the Appellant desperately tries to haff
this Utah Supreme Court review the Aoril 8, 1975, Order, and the
November 6, 1975, Order, both of which were based upon

eviden~ary

hearings and 2.l!_ the multi tu de of pleadings and exhibits which oreceded them; and, vie have clearly

shm~n

that should this court be

able to conduct such a review (which it cannot, suora.) the facts
raised by Appellant 1·;ould in any event be determined in Resoondents'
favcr under the legal principles set forth above.
The net result of all the foregoing discussion indicates that
after all of the facts raised by Appellant in its prolix argument
were adj udi ca ted by the Aoril 8, 1975, and rlovember E, 1975, orders,
there remained only a very narrow issue:

how much money did the

Respondents have to pay out for which the Apoellant was liable under
the July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation? The subject motion for
summary judgment involved only that issue and the Appellant

did~

respond v1ith a triable i5sue of fact in its single counter-affidavit,
(supra.)! In addition, the other defendants below have offered no law or
facts opposing Respondents' said position,by declininq to aopeal herein.

ARGUMENT CONCLUSION
The substantive rights of the parties v1ere resolved by the .July
23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation and the April 8, 1975, Order, both
of which decrees v1ere not appealed. These instruments form the controlling basis for the within action, (POHIT I).
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The subsequent rlovember 6, 1975, Order, the June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision and September 2, 1977, Order, in sum effect merely
reaffirm the two contra 11 i ng decrees first above mentioned, (POirlTS
II and I II).
The lower court's September 6, 1977, Judgment and findings
1-1ere a reasoned, proper extension of all that had gone on before in
this case, fully supported by the record and applicable law thereto.
The narrow issue raised by Resoondents' motion for partial summary
judgment vias not addressed by Aopellant in the latter's opposition
to said motion. Further, granting full credence to Anoellant's
single, self-serving counter-affidavit, there was still no, triable
issue of a material fact before the court below, (POiilT IV).
Aopellant raises for the first time on this aooeal the claim
that it had no knowledge of the .July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stinulation,
and then proceeds to re-hash issues already determined, and beyond
apoeal, \'/hi le obliquely referring to certain "crucial issues of fact"
remaining that would bar summary judgment herein 1·iithout showing
l'1hat those facts may be! In any case,

~

of the other factua 1 issues

discussed by Appellant, ad infinitum in its brief, were considered
and adjudicated by the Aori 1 8, 1975, and rlovember 6, 1975, orders,
after full evidentiary hearings

ther~on

and if it were possible to

review such orders (1'1hich this court may not do), whatever findings
were rendered by the court below the same must be upheld if there is
any inference whatever to support them in favor of Respondent,
(POINT V).
'41..

DATED this_!_day of

' I

fGA:>r «.rJ
04

1978, and respectfullv sub-

mitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
SERVED two copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief upon
counsel for the Appellant by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
care of said counsel addressed as follows:
WENDELL E. BENNETT, ESQ.
370 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
FABIAN &CLENDENIN
Continental Bank Building
Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
On this ___day of_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _l978,
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Residing at: _ _ _ _ __

State of Utah.

28.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

